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STUDENT COMMENTS
The following comments were written by students at Northwestern University School of Law.
Contributors to the present issue are Ronald J. Hoenig and Lawrence D. Walker.
THE TORT ALTERNATIVE TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
In Mapp v. Ohio,1 the Supreme Court attempted
to resolve a long-standing controversy over how to
protect fourth amendment rights by making the
exclusionary rule3 binding on the states.4 Reliance
on the exclusionary rule to protect fourth amend-
ment rights has been attacked because it cannot
and does not deter police misconduct in relation
to the fourth amendment, 5 it excessively hampers
law enforcement,6 and it offers no protection for
1367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
homes, papers and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
3 The exclusionary rule requires that the evidence ob-
tained by violation of constitutional rights will not be
admitted at trial against the person from whom it was
seized. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1914);
Allen, The Exclusionary Rude in the American Law of
Search and Seizure, 52 J. CRm. L.C. & P.S. 246 (1961).
In addition, evidence obtained as the "fruit of the poi-
sonous tree can be excluded." Nardone v. United States,
308 U.S. 338, 341 (1940). This comment will deal with
the rule only in relation to search and seizure, but it has
been applied to other areas of constitutional criminal
procedure. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967)
eyewitness indentification excluded if counsel not
present at lineup or unfair procedures used); Gilbert
v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 346 (1966) (statements of accused made during
police custodial interrogation excluded unless accused
informed of right to counsel and right to remain si-
lent, and rights waived).
4 Prior to Mapp, the Supreme Court had made the
exclusionary rule binding on the federal courts, Weeks
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), but reasoned that
since the rule was only court-made, it refused to make
it binding on the states. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949). As of 1960, 26 of the 50 states had adopted the
exclusionary rule. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206, 225-32 (1960).5 See, e.g., McGarr, The Exclusionary Rule: An Ill
Conceived and Ineffective Remedy, 52 J. Cnms. L.C. &
P.S. 266 (1961); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule
in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHx. L. REv. 665 (1970).6 See, e.g., Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained By
Illegal Searches-A Comment on People v. Cahan, 43
CAirr. L. REv. 565 (1955); Oaks, supra note 5.
illegal searches and seizures that do not become a
factor in a criminal proceeding.7 Tis dissatisfac-
tion was manifested in two recent Supreme Court
decisions,8 which suggests that the exclusionary
rule may be discarded or severely limited in the
near future.
In the event that the exclusionary rule is aban-
doned as the primary means of protecting fourth
amendment rights, some workable alternative
protection must be developed. As severe a critic
of the rule as Chief Justice Burger concedes
I do not propose however, that we abandon the
Suppression Doctrine until a meaningful alterna-
tive can be developed.... Obviously the public in-
terest would be poorly served if law enforcement
officials were to gain the impression, however erro-
neous, that all constitutional restraints on police
had somehow been removed-that an open season
on 'criminals' had been declared. 9
This comment will focus on one possible alterna-
tive-that of providing money damages to persons
whose amendment rights have been violated. 0
7 THE PRESmENT'S COIMSSION ON LAW ENoRcE-
MENT AND ADMINISTRATION or JUsTicE, TASK FORCE
REPoRT: THE PoLicE 200 (1967), argues that the ex-
clusionary rule is limited to police conduct which is
designed for use in a criminal case, and that only a
small proportion of police abuses have that purpose.
See also Oaks, supra note 5, at 720-21, 720 n. 157.8In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443(1971), three justices expressed their dissatisfaction
with the exclusionary rule. 403 U.S. at 490 (Harlan, J.,
concurring), 492-93 (Burger, C. J., dissenting), 510(Blackmun, J., dissenting). In Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411-27 (1971) (Burger,
C. J., dissenting), the Chief Justice articulated the basis
for his disagreement. See also Stephens, The Burger
Court: New Dimensions in Criminal Justice, 60 GEO. L.J.
249, 265-66, 277-78 (1971).
9 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S.
at 420-21. See Oaks, supra note 5, at 755-56.
10 For purposes of this discussion, it will be assumed
that a violation occurred, for purposes of creating a
cause of action, if the police conduct was such, that if
any fruit of the conduct was offered at a trial, it would
be excluded.
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Numerous alternatives have been suggested,u none
of which seems to be a complete answer to the
problem of protecting fourth amendment rights:
the use of injunctions against illegal searches and
contempt of court actions for violation of the in-
junctions; 2 internal police sanctions to punish
officers who violate the fourth amendment;"
civilian police review boards;14 and an ombudsman
system. 5 While the tort remedy has been quickly
dismissed as being incapable of providing adequate
protection for fourth amendment rights, 6 the lack
of clearly superior alternatives, along with the ap-
" See generally F. INBAU, J. THoMPsON & C. SowLE,
CASES AND ColnM NTS ON CRnUNAL JUSTICE: CRI-
iNAL LAW ADMINIsTRATION 38-84 (3d ed. 1968).
12 McNear v. Rhay, 65 Wash. 2d 530, 398 P.2d 732(1965) (Finley, J., concurring); Blumrosen, Contempt
of Court and Unlawful Police Action, 11 RUTGERS L.
Rlv. 526 (1957). The obvious problem with the mecha-
nism is that the victim must know that the illegality
will take place and proceed to obtain the injunction.
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 182 (1948)
(Jackson, J., dissenting). The remedy may be useful in
a situation where the police engage in a planned, obvious
program of harassment. See Lankford v. Gelston, 364
F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966) (injunction granted even
though police commissioner had already ordered a stop
to systematic search of black neighborhood). Even if
the injunction could be obtained against all illegal
searches and seizures and against the command struc-
ture of the police department, it is doubtful whether the
court could enforce the injunction without serious
repercussions on the whole law enforcement system. M.
PAULSEN, C. WVHITEBREAD, & R. BONNIE in J. CAMP-
BELL, J. SAIED & D. STANG, LAW AND ORDER REcON-
SmERED, REPORT TO THE NATIONAL ComassiSoN ON
THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE 380-81
(1969).
13 The internal police review system suffers from a
public perception that police do not adequately en-
courage reporting, do not properly investigate citizen
complaints, nor take meaningful disciplinary steps even
if violations are found. M. PAULSEN et al., supra note
12, at 383-86.
11 Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 Ar.
U.L. REv. 1, 17-21 (1964), advocates such a system.
While this concept was popular a few years ago, struc-
tural inadequacies of the boards and police protests
have resulted in such boards falling by the wayside.
Feld, Police Violence and Protest, 55 MnN . L. REv.
721, 760 (1971). See also W. GELLORN, WHEN AmEu-
CANS COMPLAIN: GOVERNMENTAL GRIEvA NcE PRO-
cEDURES 185 (1966).
Is IV. GELLUORN, supra note 14, at 192 and M.
PAULSEN et al., supra note 12, at 391-97, support this
approach or some hybrid between it and the civilian
review board approach. However, there is no experience
with the ombudsman approach and it is impossible to
judge the effectiveness of the remedy. Oaks, supra note
5, at 674.
16 K. DAVIs ADmNiSTRATIE LAW TREATISE § 26.03
(1958); Atkinson, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained
Through Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 25 COLum.
L. REv. 11, 24 (1925); Barrett, supra note 6, at 568;
Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individua-
Rights, 39 Mizy L. REv. 493 (1955); Paulsen, Safe-
parent success of the remedy in Canada 7 and the
advocacy of such a system by Chief Justice
Burger, 8 suggest that the tort alternative be given
more detailed consideration.
It should be made clear at the outset that the
idea of giving money damages to victims19 as a
mechanism for protecting fourth amendment rights
is hardly new. The existence of the right to a com-
mon law tort remedy for violation of fourth
amendment rights was given as a primary reason
for the Supreme Court not adopting the exclu-
sionary rule before 1961." However, the failure
of the common law tort remedy to protect fourth
amendment rights was a prime consideration in the
decision to make the exclusionary rule binding at
both the state and federal levels."
Given this failure, any use of the tort remedy as
an alternative to the exclusionary rule will neces-
sitate eliminating the shortcomings in the present
tort remedy. This comment will first develop a
framework for analyzing the efficiency of a pro-
guards it the Law of Search and Seizure, 52 Nw. U.L.
REv. 65, 72-73 (1957); Plumb, Illegal Enforcemuent of
the Law, 24 CORN. L.Q. 337, 386 (1939).
" Oaks, supra note 5, at 701-706, suggests that the
Canadian tort remedy is real, has been reasonably ef-
fective, and has been a major factor in controlling law
enforcement behavior.18 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents 403 U.S.
388, at 411-27 (1971) (Burger, C. J., dissenting)
[hereinafter cited as Birens].
9 The tort remedy will include the right to obtain
damages by bringing an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983(1970), which provides that anyone who is deprived of
any right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Con-
stitution or laws of the United States under color of
state law can seek an appropriate remedy for redress.
Monroe v. Pape, 365 '.S. 167 (1961), is the leading
case applying this law specifically to the search and
seizure area.
20 The jurisdictions which have rejected the Weeks
doctrine have not left the right to privacy without
other means of protection.., it is not for this court
to condemn as falling below the minimum stand-
ards assured by the Due Process Clause a state's
reliance upon other methods, which if consistently
enforced, would be equally effective.
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 30-31 (1949). Id. at
30-31 n.1 indicates that the tort remedy was one of
the other methods.
21 When the Supreme Court of California adopted the
exclusionary rule, the opinion noted:
We have been compelled [to adopt the exclusionary
rule] because other remedies have completely failed
to secure compliance with the constitutional pro-
visions on the part of police officers.
People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 445, 202 P.2d 905, 921(1955). In Mapp, Mr. Justice Clark wrote, "The ex-
perience of California that such remedies have been
worthless and futile is buttressed by the experience of
other states." 367 U.S. at 652.
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cedure for protecting fourth amendment rights.
It will then isolate the reasons for the failure of
the tort remedy as it existed before Mapp. Finally,
this comment will examine whether these failures
can be overcome satisfactorily so that the tort
remedy can be made an effective alternative to the
exclusionary rule.
GoALs oF A SYsTEM To PROTECT FouRTH
AMENDMENT RriGmsS
In attempting to protect fourth amendment
rights, two goals are apparent, deterrence of viola-
tions of fourth amendment rights and compensa-
tion of the violations that do occur. Historically,
the greatest consideration in deciding what protec-
tion is to be given fourth amendment rights has
been given to deterring violations of those rights.
Creation of an environment where law enforcement
officers will have no incentive to conduct illegal
searches and seizures has been emphasized. While
Mapp did not specifically emphasize the deterrence
factor,"2 subsequent decisions have made it clear
that deterrence was the prime consideration in
Mapp's adoption of the exclusionary rule.23
The deterrence goal seems justified both in light
of our philosophical approach to civil liberties and
in light of practical considerations. In the area of
civil liberties, our philosophy has been to deter
violations of rights rather than to ultimately
vindicate rights. This is illustrated by the existence
of the declaratory judgment, whereby enjoyment
of rights may be provided without protracted
litigation.24 Further, the controversy concerning
2Mapp cannot be said to enunciate the deterrence
theory in that only five justices made clear their ac-
ceptance of the exclusionary rule, and of those, Justice
Black based his concurrence on the fifth amendment
rationale that admitting the evidence from an illegal
search, in effect, constituted self-incrimination. 367 U.S.
at 361-66. However, Justice Clark's opinion contained
suggestion of the deterrence rationale. Id. at 648, 656.
2The deterrence rationale became clear in Linkletter
v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965), where Mapp was
denied retroactive effect and the Court said, "the pur-
pose [of the Mapp decision] was to deter the lawless
action of the police .... " See Comment, Standing to
Object to an Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 34 U. Cur.
L. REv. 342, 352 (1967). See also Oaks, supra note 5,
at 670. Oaks States:
It is apparent that the principal current argument
for the exclusionary rule is a factual one: exclusion
of evidence will deter law enforcement officers from
illegal behavior.
Id. at 671.
2" Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1964),
emphasized that declaratory judgments are issued
against a statute in order to avoid the chilling effects on
personal liberties which might result if the prosecution
the Pentagon Papers - underscores the fact that
given a choice between allowing enjoyment of
rights or denying those rights and later deciding
whether the denial was proper, we favor the former
course. In the fourth amendment area, it is better
to initially prevent an unreasonable search from
occurring than to later decide that the search was
unreasonable and attempt some compensatory
action.2 6
On a more practical level, society has a vested
interest in deterring violations of rights because
such police violations exacerbate social ten-
sions.2
This is not to say that an adequate system of
deterring violations of fourth amendment rights
would totally eliminate tensions, given that other
police misconduct might still occur. However, any
reduction in social tensions is desirable s and the
historically deterrent goal of fourth amendment
protection devices should be maintained in any
alternative to the exclusionary rule.
While deterrence of illegal police conduct should
be the primary goal of a system to protect fourth
amendment rights, it must be conceded that no
system can, or should, deter all violations of
fourth amendment rights. A law enforcement
officer might technically violate a citizen's fourth
amendment rights, though he acted in good faith
and believed that he was complying with constitu-
tional requirements. To the extent that a fourth
amendment protection device so deters police as to
prevent such actions, law enforcement is seriously
hampered. The exclusionary rule does not recog-
were commenced, even though the defendant may ulti-
mately be acquitted. Though the declaratory judgment
remedy has been limited in scope by the recent decision
in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (threat to
plaintiff's federally protected rights must be such that
it cannot be eliminated by his defense against a single
state criminal prosecution), the remedy still indicates
some desire to avoid having constitutional rights de-
pend on the plaintiff winning a protracted suit.
"- New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713 (1971) (prior restraint of publication disallowed).
26 This philosophy is also exemplified by the Supreme
Court's demand that search warrants be obtained wher-
ever possible. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443, 449-51 (1971); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 357 (1967). The purpose is to have a disinterested
magistrate examine the facts in an attempt to avoid
unreasonable searches, rather than to conclude later
that the search was unreasonable.
27See, e.g., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL A~nvlsoRa
CoaSSlON ON Cm L DisoRDEys 206, 284, 305 (paper
ed. 1968).
"The relation of police misconduct to civil disorders
suggests a subgoal of the deterrence goal, namely that
the protective system must deal with searches and seiz-
ures not intended to produce evidence to be used at
trial. See note 7 supra for the dimensions of this problem.
[Vol. 63
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nize that such honest mistakes are bound to occur
in the best programs of law enforcement. If the
search is deemed unreasonable under fourth
amendment standards, the motivation of the
officer is irrelevant with regard to preventing the
exclusion of evidence. 9 A rational fourth amend-
ment protection system should recognize that some
violations are bound to occur and provide com-
pensation to the victim of the search, rather than
exclude the evidence produced in the same way
that it is excluded for a wanton and willful viola-
tion of fourth amendment rights. Thus, in addition
to deterring illegal searches and seizures, a fourth
amendment protection device should make some
provision for adequately compensating those vic-
tims of illegal searches that cannot and should not
be deterred30
In seeking an alternative to the exclusionary
rule, two goals become apparent. First, the system
must do at least as good a job of deterring illegal
police conduct with respect to fourth amendment
rights as the exclusionary rule. Second, to the ex-
tent that the deterrent effect is ineffective, as it
will be to some extent under any system of deter-
rence, an alternative device should be available
to adequately compensate the victim of illegal
searches and seizures." The existing tort remedy
has failed to meet these goals. Before attempting
to determine whether the tort remedy can be made
into an effective alternative to the exclusionary
rule, the reasons for this failure must be isolated.
DEyEcTs IN Tim PRESENT TORT REMEDY
The Sovereign Immunity Doctrine
One of the major shortcomings in the present
tort remedy is its inability to provide suitable
29 But see ALl MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNSIENT
PROCEDURE § 8.02(2)(3) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1971),
where the committee suggests that evidence be excluded
only where the violation of rights is substantial. Some
of the factors to be considered include the extent of de-
viation from lawful conduct and the extent to which
the violation was lawful. This idea has received judicial
support in United States v. Soyka, 394 F.2d 443, 452
(2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., concurring).30 While the fourth amendment says nothing about
providing compensation for victims, philosophically if
a right is violated there should be a remedy. Moreover,
this philosophy is recognized in Bivens, where the ma-
jority held that violation of fourth amendment rights
per se created a cause of action for damages. 403 U.S.
388, (1971).
31The idea of compensation also has a relation to the
deterrence goal. The deterrent is provided by the fact
that potential offenders know that their misconduct will
result in a penalty against them and in favor of the vic-
tim. Thus the potential for compensation creates the
force which deters deliberate violations in the first place.
defendants against whom recovery can be sought.
The present system tends to restrict liability to
the police officer or other governmental agent con-
ducting the search. The doctrine of sovereign
immunity,2 if in effect, 3 provides an absolute bar
to bringing an action against the governmental
body employing the law enforcement officer. Even
if the doctrine has been curtailed, an exception may
be created for acts of law enforcement officers. 4
Florida, for example, although it was a pioneer
in abandoning the sovereign immunity doctrine, 5
still holds that "[i]t is unthinkable that a municipal
corporation exercising its police power for the
protection of the public, should be liable for every
mistake in judgment by its officer." 36 Moreover,
if the plaintiff attempts to bring his action under
the Civil Rights Acts,"' the employer of the offend-
ing officer cannot be held accountable.13 The net
result of these various doctrines is that, by and
large, the aggrieved person will only be able to seek
redress against the law enforcement officers in-
32 The sovereign immunity doctrine developed out of
the idea that the "king can do no wrong" and that it is a
contradiction to allow the sovereign to be sued in courts
he created without the king giving his consent. When
monarchies were replaced by democratic forms of gov-
ernment, the same analysis was applied with "govern-
ment" being substituted for "king." W. PROSSER, LAW
Ox TORTS § 131, at 970-71 (4th ed. 1971). The doctrine
has been specifically applied to actions by police officers.
Id. at 979.
1 The doctrine of sovereign immunity has been under
attack in recent years and is being abrogated both legis-
latively and judicially. At the federal level the doctrine
was largely abolished by the Federal Tort Claims Act,
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1970). Seventeen
states have court decisions at least partially abrogating
the doctrine at the municipal level, and five states have
statutory enactments doing the same thing. PROSSER,
supra note 32, at 984-87. Many of the decisions or
laws pertaining to municipal liability also apply to state
governments. Id. at 977, 984-87. The doctrine is, how-
ever, still quite strong at the state and local level for
acts of policemen. 2 C. A. ANTIEu, MuNiciPAL CoRPo-
RATION LAW § 11.11 (1971), 18 F. McQuiLLIAN, imi-
CIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.79 (3d ed. 1963, and Supp.
1971).
34 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1970) creates an exception for
any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprison-
ment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of
process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit or in-
terference with contract rights within the otherwise
broad abrogation of the sovereign immunity doctrine
on the federal level.
35 W. PRossEm, supra note 32, at 985, citing Hargrove
v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
36 City of Miami v. Albro, 120 So. 2d. 23, 26 (Fla.
App. 1960).
37 See note 19 supra.
38 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191 (1961), held
that a local government is not a person for purposes
of the act and thus it cannot be held liable for actions
f its policemen who violate the act.
19721
COMMENT
volved, rather than against the relevant govern-
mental unit.
The problem with bringing suit against indi-
vidual officers is finding assets sufficient to satisfy
a judgment.39 Even if this problem were overcome,
there is a serious policy question as to whether
the officer should be made to pay. The threat of
large judgments could deter vigorous law enforce-
ment by the individual officer, deter qualified
people from entering public service, and unjustly
penalize officers and their families for what may
only be a mistake in judgment.40 To the extent
that the lingering concept of sovereign immunity
dictates that the sole available defendant is the
offending officer, a dilemma results. Either the
victim of the illegal search and seizure is inade-
quately compensated, and no real deterrence of
police misconduct occurs, or the victim is ade-
quately compensated at the expense of undesirable
over-deterrence of the law enforcement structure.
Inadequacies in Substantive Law
Theoretically, the victim of an illegal search
and seizure is at no loss for causes of action on
which to base recovery. The right to a common
law trespass action has long existed, and its exist-
ence was given as a major reason for refusing to
adopt the exclusionary rule before 1961.41 Of more
recent vintage are the right to seek damages under.
42 U.S.C. § 1983, where one's right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures has been denied
under color of state law," and the right to state
a cause of action for damages against federal offi-
cers because of violation of fourth amendment
rights." There is, however, a large gap between
39 PRESmIENTSS COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEM:ENT
AND ADmimSTRATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 199;
Mathes & Jones, Toward A "Scope of Official Duty"
Immunity for Police Officers in Damage Actions, 53
GEO. L.J. 889, 908 (1965). The average minimum
salary of a policeman is $8,477 and the average maxi-
mum is $10,040. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 150 (92d ed. 1971).
40 Mathes & Jones, supra note 39, at 908. See also
M. PAULSEN, et al., supra note 12, at 375; Paulsen,
supra note 16, at 73.
41 See note 20 supra. For states recognizing the tres-
pass remedy, see, e.g., Grumon v. Raymond, 1 Conn.
40 (1814); Eleuteri v. Richman, 148 N.J. Super. 303,
128 A.2d 7J43 (1956); Doane v. Anderson, 60 Hun. 586,
15 N.Y.S. 459 (N.Y. 1891); Deaderick v. Smith, 33
Tenn. App. 151, 230 S.W.2d 406 (1950); Dellastatious
v. Boyce, 152 Va. 368, 47 S.E. 267 (1929). The trespass
action could be combined with other common law ac-
tions such as false arrest or false imprisonment if the
course of conduct containing the search also contained
the elements of these offenses.
42 See note 19 supra.
4 Biens 403 U.S. 388 (1971), granted this right.
these theoretical rights of action and effective
remedies.
There will be no recovery if the person sued
has a complete defense available. In the common
law trespass action, in many jurisdictions, an
officer serving a warrant fair on its face cannot
be held liable for damages. 4 It is unclear what
defenses may be available in a non warrant situa-
tion.45 In a section 1983 action the officer appar-
ently has a defense based on some combination of
good faith and probable cause.46 Thus, while one
may have been a victim of an illegal search and
seizure, there may be no liability on the part of
any of the participants.
Furthermore, assuming liability on the part
of the officer can be shown, the standard for dam-
ages may preclude recovery. The usual standards
for compensatory damages in a trespass action
are phrased in terms of injury that naturally,
directly, and proximately results from the wrong,7
or as the injury to property, feelings, and reputa-
tion, plus family disturbance, resulting from the
search." There is also a right to recover punitive
damages in some states if the offending officer
acted with malice or ill will49 or in reckless and
wanton disregard of plaintiff's rights.50 In federal
actions under section 1983, plaintiffs are not neces-
sarily limited to state rules on damages, but federal
rules may be used.5' The general standard in the
federal area for compensatory damages is out of
4" See, e.g., Williams v. Franzoni, 217 F.2d 533 (2d
Cir. 1954); Campbell v. Blankenship, 308 Ky. 808, 215
S.W.2d 960 (1940); Houghtaling v. State, 11 Misc. 2d
1049, 175 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1958); McFarland v. Shirkey,
106 Ohio App. 517, 151 N.E.2d. 797 (1958).
45 Neither the plaintiff's bad reputation nor the fact
that the search produced incriminating evidence can be
pleaded as a defense. McClurg v. Brenton, 123 Iowa
368, 98 N.W. 81 (1904).
46 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967), provides
that a defense is available where the elements of good
faith and probable cause are present. However, Joseph
v. Rowlen, 402 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1968), held that mere
good faith without probable cause is not a defense.
4See, e.g., State v. Wynn, 214 Miss. 348, 56 So. 2d
824 (1953); Bouillion v. LaClede Gaslight Co., 148 Mo.
App. 462, 129 S.W. 401 (1910) (private party trespass).
48See, e.g., Fennemore v. Armstrong, 29 Del. 35,
46 A. 204 (1915); Dellastatious v. Boyce, 152 Va. 368,
147 S.E. 267 (1929). See also Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25, 43 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
49 Fennemore v. Armstrong, 29 Del. 35, 46 A. 204,
(1915); Dellastatious v. Boyce, 152 Va. 368, 147 S.E.
267 (1929).
50 See, e.g., Khrebiel v. Hbnkle, 152 Iowa 604, 129
N.W. 945 (1911); Caffini v. Hermann, 112 Me. 282,
91 A. 1009 (1914).
51 Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229
(1969).
[Vol. 6,3
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pocket pecuniary losses, plus an award for emo-
tional and mental distress. 2 Punitive damages may
also be recovered under section 1983 if the de-
fendant has acted willfully or in gross disregard for
plaintiff's rights.0
These standards suggest that unless the offend-
ing law enforcement officer substantially damages
the premises to be searched, i.e., causes large out
of pocket expenses, the possibility of substantial
recovery is minimal at best, 4 since many potential
plaintiffs will have a difficult time showing injury
to reputation and feelings.55 The availability of
punitive damages does little to improve the situa-
tion, because the required degree of malice and
ill will is probably the exception rather than the
norm in police conduct. If the requisite level of
misconduct is present, the offending officer prob-
ably did more than just conduct an illegal search,
and the plaintiff would do better by seeking dam-
ages for the other misconduct.55
Even if some threshold claim to adequate dam-
ages can be established under these standards,
the common law action for trespass will allow
mitigation57 of damages. Among grounds held
admissible for mitigation of damages are the poor
reputation of the plaintiff prior to the incident,n3
the good faith or lack of malice by the offending
officer,5" and the fact that the victim was ulti-
62 Donovan v. Reinhold, 433 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1964).
"3 Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 429 F.2d 290
(5th Cir. 1970) (punitive damages assessable if conduct
is willfull and in gross disregard of rights).
64 See Foote, supra note 16, at 500; Paulsen, supra
note 16, at 72.
1 5Two examples demonstrate the problem. In Sexton
v. Gibbs, 327 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Tex. 1970), the plain-
tiff in a § 1983 action was given $750 in compensatory
damages for the humiliation, embarrassment, discom-
fort and loss of rights suffered because of a false arrest
and illegal search of his car. In Mason v. Wrightson,
205 Md. 481, 109 A.2d 128 (1954), a lawyer's humilia-
tion from being illegally searched was found to merit
one cent in damages. Courts seem to concede that, in
effect there will be no real recovery.
Given the fact that no violence or injury greater
than necessary was done, it is probable that very
small damages will be recovered upon another trial.
Sanford v. Nichols, 13 Mass. 286, 290 (1816).
56 M. PAULSEN, et al., supra note 12, at 373.
VThe theory behind allowing mitigation is that all
facts and circumstances which tend to explain or dis-
close the design of the party committing the wrongful
act should go to the jury for their consideration. See,
e.g., Simpson v. McCaffery, 13 Ohio 508 (1844).
r Banfill v. Boyd, 122 Miss. 288, 84 So. 227 (1920);
Paulsen, supra note 16, at 72. "The proof of bad reputa-
tion may also be used to show probable cause for a
search, thus defeating of claim for punitive damages."
Foote, supra note 16, at 514.
69DeHart v. Gray, 245 S.W.2d 434 (Ky. App. 1952);
Gamble v. Keyes, 35 S.D. 644, 133 N.W. 888 (1915);
mately convicted of a crime on the basis of evi-
dence seized in the search."0 Given the possibility
of mitigation of the already inadequate damages,
providing redress for victims of fourth amendment
violations adequate to deter these violations is
virtually precluded.
Procedural Problems
In addition to the lack of suitable defendants
and the inadequacies of the substantive law in
the area of defenses and damages, the potential
plaintiff in a search and seizure case may be con-
fronted with various procedural problems. If the
victim of the illegal search has been convicted of
a crime and imprisoned since the incident, the
concept of civil death, whereby a prisoner cannot
bring civil actions while he is imprisoned, may
act as a bar to his bringing any action for dam-
ages." The possible expense of litigation coupled
with the long delay in action -on civil suits may
also act as a deterrent to a potential plaintiff
bringing a suit. Moreover, lawyers are not anxious
to get involved in such suits because of the low
probability of success. 3 Both of these factors have
Sutherland v. Kroger Co. 144 W. Va. 673, 110 S.E.2d
716 (1959) (in action for search against private party,
circumstances tending to arouse reasonable suspicion
may be shown).
60 Long v. Mann, 259 Ala. 17, 65 So. 2d 500 (1953)
(search subsequent to a false arrest disclosed contra-
band which formed basis for conviction). The fact that
such a standard results in inadequate damages and no
real deterrence has been recognized and approved by
courts.
This is doubtless true and ought to be true. He who
has voluntarily made his home a den of thieves, a
distillery for the manufacture of contraband liquor,
a warehouse for infernal machines or a safety de-
posit box for forged documents of counterfeit causes
has not sustained the same damages when its sanc-
tity is invaded as has the citizen who has main-
tained that sanctity.
Massantonio v. People, 77 Colo. 392, 398, 236 P. 1019,
1021 (1925). Theoretically, under the exclusionary rule,
this situation could never arise because the illegally
seized evidence could not be used to sustain a convic-
tion. However, to the extent that the tort remedy is
viewed as an alternative to the exclusionary rule, this
sort of philosophy will have to be recognized and dealt
with.
61 Thirteen states, listed in Comment, Civil Death-
A New Look At Ans Ancient Doctrine, 11 Wm. & MARY
L. REv. 988 (1970), have such statutes.
Potential plaintiffs who are in prison usually must
wait until they are released to get their tort remedy.
In the meantime, the statute of limitations may
run, or the defendant may be able to get the suit
dismissed for lack of prosecution.
Foote, supra note 16, at 508.
2 M. PAULSEN et al., supra note 12, at 374.
See Note, Philadelphia Police Practices and The
Law of Arrest, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 1182 (1952).
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combined to convince many disadvantaged people
that they have no effective channel for lodging
complaints against a police officer.64 Finally, the
potential plaintiff must present his case to a jury.
The unfortunate fact is that the social status of
the average victim of an illegal search is such
that the average juror will not be sympathetic
but, more likely, will be hostile to the victim's
cause.
65
On balance then, the major inadequacies of the
present system in providing a tort remedy for
illegal searches and seizures suggest that the fol-
lowing elements must be available to provide an
adequate remedy. 6 First, the aggrieved victim
should have redress against a financially capable
defendant. Second, there must be some form of
absolute liability for illegal searches and seizures.
Third, the measure of damages must provide an
adequate level of recovery. Fourth, the system
must be open to all victims, be easy to use and
avoid the pitfalls of the jury system. It remains
to be seen however, whether a system embodying
these elements will provide a workable alternative
to the exclusionary rule.
THE TORT RESmSDY AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO
THE EXCLUSIONARY R LE
The Burger Proposal
Any change in the tort remedy for violation of
fourth amendment rights would have to be made
in the individual state legislatures. The most
that can be done here is to suggest a model solu-
tion.Y Thus far, it appears that only one compre-
hensive proposal has been set out as a possible
solution to be adopted by the various jurisdic-
'4 M. PAULSEN a al., supra note 12, at 374. See also
Hundley, Dynamics of Recent Ghetto Riots, 45 J. URBAn
L. 627, 630 (1968).65 See Foote, supra note 16, at 500; Paulsen, supra
note 16, at 72.
16 The question of actions for wrongful eavesdrop-
ping has not and will not be considered. Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), makes clear that such
actions violate fourth amendment rights. However, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970) may already have provided
a remedy in this area in that a criminal penalty is
prescribed for those who eavesdrop in § 2511, and a
civil action for damages is set up under § 2520 whereby
the victim receives either $100 per day or $1,000, which-
ever is greater, in actual damages, plus the possibility
of punitive damages and attorney's fees. Of course,
exactly how one finds out that he is being spied upon
is another question. See SEN. REP. No. 1097, 90th
Cong. 2d Sess. (1968).
17 It is possible that true uniformity could exist given
recent success in adopting various uniform laws such
as the UN-FoRm Co RCIAL CODE.
tions.6 This proposal, as set forth by Chief Justice
Burger, has five elements:
(a) a waiver of sovereign immunity as to-the illegal
acts of law enforcement officials committed in
the performance of assigned dities;
(b) the creation of a cause of action for damages
sustained by any person aggrieved by conduct
of governmental agents in violation of the
Fourth Amendment or statutes regulating offi-
cial conduct;
(c) the creation of a tribunal, quasijudicial in na-
ture or perhaps patterned after the United
States Court of Claims to adjudicate all claims
under the statute;
(d) a provision that this statutory remedy is in
lieu of the exclusion of evidence secured for
use in criminal cases in violation of the Fourth
Amendment; and
(e) a provision directing that no evidence other-
wise admissible shall be excluded from any
criminal proceeding because of violation of the
Fourth Amendment.69
With regard to the specific problems inherent
in the present tort remedy, this proposal seems
to be a step in the right direction. The abrogation
of sovereign immunity in this area would guarantee
financially responsible defendants, while avoiding
the over-deterrence inherent in leaving the indi-
vidual officer as the potential defendant. 0 The
proposal also appears to create absolute liability
for violation of rights, thus avoiding the possibility
of the defenses mentioned above." The quasi-
judicial nature of the board appears to eliminate
the procedural problems inherent in the present
system by avoiding crowded courts and removing
the possibility that jury prejudice will deny ade-
quate recovery.7
8 Specifically, Burger proposes that the federal
government adopt the proposal first.
Once the constitutional validity of such a statute
is established, it can reasonably be assumed that
the States would develop their own remedial sys-
tems on the federal model. Indeed, there is nothing
to prevent a State from enacting a comparable
statutory scheme without waiting for Congress.
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 423-24 (Burger, C. J., dissenting).69 Id. at 422-23.70 See notes 33-40 supra and accompanying text.71 See notes 44-46 supra and accompanying text.712 The quasijudicial board could presumably fashion
simplified procedures, thus decreasing cost and increas-
ing speed of action. The concept of civil death, see note
61 supra, should probably be specifically abrogated by
statute. As to the question of possible jury prejudice:
I doubt that lawyers serving on such a tribunal
would be swayed either by undue sympathy for
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Despite the improvements offered by the Chief
Justice's proposal, one critical problem is not
adequately dealt with: the problem of how dam-
ages will be measured and awarded. The Chief
Justice analogized his system to the respondeat
superior concept that prevails in an action against
a store owner for an illegal search by a security
guard, 7 suggesting that damages in such actions
are "often sufficient in size to provide an effective
deterrent and to stimulate employers to corrective
action." 7' However, the respondeat superior doc-
trine only guarantees that a financially capable
defendant is available. It does not alter common
law damage standards. In order to produce ade-
quate damages, the doctrine presupposes an aver-
age plaintiff, with average feelings and reputation.
The common law standard of damages for an
illegal trespass will compensate the injury to those
feelings and that reputation 5 The victim of a
police violation of fourth amendment rights is
more likely to lack this aura of respectability,
and the common law allows evidence of this lack
of respectability to be introduced in mitigation
of damagesY Thus, the respondeat superior doc-
trine is unlikely to have the same effectiveness
as a general fourth amendment protection device
as it has in compensating those who have been
wrongfully searched by a private party.
One possible solution to this problem would
be to provide some statutory minimum level of
damages, with the minimum set high enough to
adequately compensate the victim and to provide
sufficient incentive to the police department to
curb illegal practices. This approach has the addi-
tional advantage of minimizing the need for as-
signing a dollar value to intangibles such as loss
of reputation on a case by case basis. There is
also precedent for such a solution in the area of
wiretappingY7 Of course, deciding where the statu-
tory minimum should be set could prove difficult,
officers or prejudice against criminals that has
sometimes moved lay jurors to deny claims.
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 423 (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
73 The authority cited is W. PROSSzR, THm LAw oF
ToRTs 470 (3d ed. 1964). The basis for imposing lia-
bility on the storekeeper is the deep pocket theory of
torts, namely that the storekeeper is in a better posi-
tion to absorb the cost and distribute the losses. Id. at
471.
7 403 U.S. at 422 n. 5.75 See notes 47-50 supra and accompanying text.7r See notes 57-60 supra and accompanying text.
18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1970). See note 66 supra. Other
writers have urged that the liquidated damages ap-
proach be taken in the fourth amendment area. Foote,
supra note 13, at 514-15.
but this approach seems to offer the best hope for
solving the damages problem.
Thus, it seems that the Chief Justice's proposal,
with the addition of a minimum damages provision,
could alleviate what seem to be the major short-
comings of the present tort remedy. However,
even with these improvements it is quite possible
that no tort system can produce adequate deter-
rence of police misconduct and that any system
that attempts to produce it will be politically
unacceptable.
The Problem of Deterrence
Even if a system removing the major problems
of the present tort remedy were adopted, it is
unclear that the crucial goal of deterrence7n would
be realized. Those who advocate abrogation of
the doctrine of sovereign immunity argue that
imposing liability on governments will force them
to take steps to correct police misconduct. For
example:
Police tactics are often institutional and awards
against the state may modify institutional prac-
tices.79
Controls over personnel are not likely to be estab-
lished where only isolated items of liability exist,
whereas tort liability would doubtless force them
upon the municipalities.as
[Imposition of liability for torts will not result in
interference with proper carrying out of municipal
functions]. It is more likely that the potential
liability thus imposed will operate to compel the
discharge of dangerous or incompetent persons.as
Such statements seem to be little more than pure
speculation. Indeed, at least one critic of the ex-
clusionary rule concedes that there is no empirical
proof for the proposition that imposition of liabil-
ity will have the deterrent effect expected' The
closest thing to such empirical evidence is found
in the industrial safety field where there is some
evidence that imposition of liability has the effect
of forcing the employer to isolate accident-prone
78 See notes 21-27 supra and accompanying text.79Jaffee, Suits Against Governments and Officers:
Damage Actions, 77 HAuv. L. Rv. 209, 228 (1963).
"I Fuller & Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Oper-
ation, 54 Hkxv. L. REv. 437, 454 (1941).
"1 Smith, Municipal Tort Liability, 48 MIca. L.
REv. 41, 50-51 (1949).
82 Thus far there is no showing that either enlarged
liability or indemnity has realized the expectation
that governmental agencies exposed to the prospect
of liability would take steps to minimize their risk
by effectively reducing police misbehavior.
Oaks, supra note 5, at 673 n. 37.
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employees from situations where an accident might
result.u
These assertions that imposition of tort liability
will result in deterrence of unlawful conduct are
largely unfounded in logic or fact. From the point
of view of the individual policeman, imposition
of liability on the part of the municipality may
actually remove a deterrent from his actionsM
Such a result would flow from the fact that police
would no longer worry about anyone suing them
personally, believing that the victim would instead
tend to sue only the government entity 85
Further, the criticisms of the exclusionary rule
apply equally well to the tort remedy. One major
argument against the deterrence-producing capa-
bility of the exclusionary rule is that the real de-
terrent falls on the prosecutor, not on the police.
Critics claim that law enforcement is not a mono-
lithic structure, and so, the police are not aware
of the pressure created by the exclusionary rule.
86
The same argument applies to the tort remedy.
The immediate impact of an adverse judgment
will not fall on the police department, but on the
governmental treasury. If the compartmentalized
structure of law enforcement machinery prevented
the frustrated prosecutor from putting effective
pressure on the police to curb their illegal practices,
it seems just as likely that the same compart-
mentalization will prevent the taxing authorities
from putting effective pressure on the police.
While those who advocate the abrogation of
sovereign immunity might respond that public
pressure to hold down expenditures would compel
&3 Competent studies, as well as experience, indi-
cate that incentives to safety and proper execution
are greatest where tort liability is imposed upon
the large corporate defendant rather than upon.
the individual employees whose negligence or mis-
conduct causes injury to other persons.
Mathes & Jones, supra note 39, at 907-08. One of the
sources cited is 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMEs, THE LAW
or TORTs § 11.4 (1956). But see W. PRossER, supra
note 32, at 451, where the argument is said to be a
make-weight.
8 Kennedy & Lynch, Some Problems of A Sovereign
Witlwut Immunity, 36 So. CAL. L. REv. 161, 178. This
argument is subject to the response that cities will
proceed against the wrongdoing officer to recover all
or part of the loss. Fuller & Casner, supra note 80, at
69; Jaffee, supra note 79, at 228.
85 To the extent that an officer worries about his
family's security, he may be more careful in deciding
whether to engage in illegal conduct. Of course, the
result of his worrying may be over-deterrence. See note
40 supra and accompanying text.
86 But the prosecutor who loses his case because of
police misconduct is not an official in the police
department: he can rarely set in motion any correc-
tive action or administrative penalties.
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 417 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
elected officials to take drastic steps fo force police
departments to curb illegal practices, an additional
argument to be made against the deterrence-pro-
ducing capacity of the tort remedy is that such
pressure is unlikely to materialize. While police
departments may indeed respond to political pres-
sure,n prosecutors, because of public indignation
over crime and lawlessness, have presumably felt
the need to crack down on police abuses that result
in criminals going free.Hs However, such pressure
has been manifestly ineffective in forcing police
to curb such practices8 9 While public concern over
high taxes is as great, if not greater than, concern
over crime and lawlessness, 0 it hardly seems
likely that such concern, focused on budgetary
officials, will result in any more effective pressure
on police departments than that now applied by
the prosecutor.8 '
The arguments given here against the ability
of abrogation of sovereign immunity to generate
a deterrent effect admittedly lack empirical veri-
fication. Yet the arguments for the proposition
suffer from precisely the same defect. It may be
true that if the system were put into operation
it would produce the deterrent effect. However,
before modifications in the tort remedy are intro-
duced as an alternative to the exclusionary rule,
we should require far more evidence of the deter-
rent effect of the tort remedy than we have to
this date.
The Problem of Political Feasibility
While a system which has the theoretical capa-
bility to protect fourth amendment rights may
be developed, such a remedy must first be politi-
87J.Q. WnsON, VARIEUIES oF POLICE BEHAVIOR
227-36 (1968).
88 12% of the people in the country feel crime is the
most important problem in the country. Gallup Opinion
Index, October, 1971, at 3. Fifty-six percent feel that
the crime problem ranks in the top three of all problems.
Id., June, 1970, at 8.
89 If the arguments of the critics of the exclusionary
rule are correct, and deterrence has not resulted, see
Oaks, supra note 5, then by implication public opinion
has not had any effect.90 Two thirds of the country feels that taxes are too
high, though this apparently is always the case. Louis
Harris poll quoted in Lim, Aug. 15, 1969, at 22.
91 Another possible response to this argument is to
point to the successful Canadian experience with the
tort remedy, see note 17 supra, which suggests that
deterrence can result from the tort remedy. However,
it seems that Canadian police tend to be much more
responsive to judicial criticism of their conduct than
their American counterparts, and unlike the compart-
mentalized structure of American law enforcement,
Canadian prosecutors can exert significant control over
police practices. Oaks, supra note 17, at 705-06.
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cally accepted and instituted.12 Insurmountable
barriers may prohibit such adoption. Many juris-
dictions may be dissuaded from adopting an effec-
tive tort remedy because of its expense. If police
violations are as rampant as suggested by the
numerous failures of the exclusionary rule,93 and
if adequate damages are available for each viola-
tion, the potential cost of an adequate tort remedy
would be quite high. While state and local govern-
ments may be able to make the cost predictable
by purchasing insurance, the premium for such
insurance would still reflect what the insurer feels
he will have to pay out and thus be quite expen-
sive.94 At least two factors suggest that govern-
mental units will be unwilling to bear the burden
of this expense. Given the poor financial status
of many state and local governmental units95
the cost burden of an adequate tort remedy could
be met only by increasing taxes. Citizens generally
believe that taxes are too high96 and that they
should not be raised.Y Therefore, it is very doubt-
ful that taxpayers would tolerate any large new
public expenditure along this line. Moreover, the
fact that the tort remedy will primarily benefit
elements of the community that the average tax-
payer has no sympathy for would further decrease
the willingness of voters to approve of a tort rem-
edy.3 While the public may resent the exclusionary
rule because of its alleged inhibiting effect on law
enforcement,99 the dislike for higher taxes and the
92 Conceivably, parts of the remedy could be judi-
dally adopted, for example, the abrogation of the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity. See note 33 supra. How-
ever, the courts would probably view a comprehensive
proposal as being within the legislative domain.931 If the exclusionary rule has not deterred illegal
searches, but a sufficient number of illegal searches are
conducted to result in a large number of criminals avoid-
ing punishment, and if police commit a serious number
of illegal searches with no intent to bring a criminal
charge, then by definition there will be many oppor-
tunities for the tort remedy to operate. For a suggestion
that the situations described above do occur frequently,
see notes 5-7 supra.
01 Kennedy & Lynch, supra note 84, at 178. But see
Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Decade of
Change, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 919, 921 (1966).
95 See generally SuBcommn. ON FIscAL PoLICY, JorNT
Ecoxomc Comm., REvENuEt SHARInG AND ITs ALTER-
NATIVES-WHAT FUTRE FOR FISCAL FEIERAMLSM?,
90th Cong., ist Sess. (1967); Pechman, Fiscal Federal-
ism in the 1970's, 24 NAT. TAx. J. 281 (1971).
16 See note 90 supra.
97 U.S. N-ws & WORrD REP., Feb. 10, 1969, at 28.
111 cannot believe that governmental units will
bear any substantial expenditures to compensate
the bums, grifters sie], petty crooks, or big time
operators who are the most probable victims of
police misconduct.
Paulsen, supra note 16, at 73.
99 To the extent that the public sees crime as a prob-
dislike for paying judgments to disreputable ele-
ments suggest that the tort alternative will face
serious political hurdles.
Another factor suggesting the political un-
feasibility of the tort remedy can be found in the
apathy of many jurisdictions. Numerous states
had the exclusionary rule imposed on them by
state supreme courts long before Jlfapp required
exclusionjlu These states apparently made no
real effort to develop effective alternatives to the
exclusionary rule during that time, and at least
some doubt arises as to whether these same states
will feel any overwhelming desire to rid themselves
of the exclusionary rule at this time. Thus, no
matter how well conceived the tort remedy may
be, the political fact of resentment toward higher
taxes and resentment of paying judgments to
"criminals," coupled with the possible apathy
of many states may well preclude widespread
adoption of an adequate tort remedy.
CONCLUSION
While the tort remedy proposed by Chief Justice
Burger may conceptually provide adequate com-
pensation and solve the worst problems of the
present-day tort system, it has not been shown
to provide a guarantee of sufficient deterrence of
police misconduct. While the present tort system
cannot provide financially responsible defendants,
and as a result precludes adequate compensation
and deterrence, the proposed alternative com-
pensates but, just the same, may not deter. While
the present system provides inadequate damages,
thus precluding adequate compensation and de-
terrence, the proposed remedy may provide the
compensation, but its chances of being accepted
are slim.
Although the tort remedy does not appear to
be a viable alternative to the exclusionary rule
at this time because of these problems, two possible
courses of action might be taken. First, in view
of the fact that many of the results of adoption
of a tort remedy are uncertain, it may be worth-
while to create an experimental situation whereby
various alternatives to the exclusionary rule could
lem, see note 88 supra, arguably they would wish to
see the exclusionary rule eliminated.100 See note 4 supra. Many states have been able to
live with the rule for nearly fifty years, as indicated by
the date the state high court adopted the exclusionary




be compared and analyzed as to their viability in
protecting the fourth amendment.'' Specifically,
if a state develops an alternative to the exclu-
sionary rule, and applies it in a test case, the Su-
preme Court could allow that state to depend on
that alternative until it is proven effective, at
which point other states would be allowed to adopt
it,"'2 or until it is shown to be ineffective, at which
time it should be discarded.
101 For judicial recognition of the idea that it would
be worthwhile to have states attempt different proce-
dures regarding what should be done with illegally ob-
tained evidence, see generally Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443, 490-91 (1971) (Harlan, J., con-
curring).102 The Supreme Court should seek to encourage the
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On the other hand, it may be possible to con-
clude without further ado that the tort remedy
should not replace the exclusionary rule. In that
event, it may still be worthwhile for the states to
adopt a tort remedy along the lines suggested by
the Chief Justice as a supplement to the exclu-
sionary rule. Such a supplement could at least
eliminate the problem of underprotection where
the illegality is committed with no intention to
produce evidence to be used in a criminal pro-
ceedingjO3
greatest possible number of solutions under this theory.
It would be best not to allow states to adopt substan-
tially the same approach until that approach has proven
its effectiveness.
"'3 See note 7 supra.
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RECENT TRENDS IN TEE CRIMINAL LAW
HANDWR.ITING Exmn'LAns
Two federal courts have held that the taking of
handwriting exemplars and their subsequent use
at trial can violate the fourth amendment. In
United States v. Harris, 453 F.2d 1317 (8th Cir.
1972), it was held that taking exemplars for the
purpose of eliciting incriminating evidence against
an accused would be an unreasonable search and
seizure unless the defendant voluntarily consented
to giving the exemplars or the police obtained a
valid search warrant. The underlying basis of the
court's decision is that any activities by the police
which are intended to acquire incriminating infor-
mation against an accused is a search.' Because the
police in Harris never obtained a search warrant,
the court confined its discussion to the voluntari-
ness of the defendant's consent. It held that volun-
tary consent could not have been given because the
defendant was in custody at the time of writing
the exemllar and he was never given his Mfiranda
warnings.'- The court emphasized that Miranda's
purpose in deterring police conduct designed to
coerce incriminating information from an accused
could not be subverted by the use of exemplars.
The Seventh Circuit recognized the applica-
bility of the fourth amendment to handwriting
exemplars in Mara v. United States, 454 F.2d 580
(7th Cir. 1971).2 Applying the reasoning of an
earlier case dealing with voiceprints,3 the court
held that unreasonable demands for handwriting
exemplars by a grand jury violate an individual's
fourth amendment right to privacy.4 The standard
for obtaining exemplars by a grand jury in Mara
is not probable cause, but reasonableness.5 Accord-
' See Haer v. United States, 240 F.2d 533 (5th Cir.
1957).
'Without reaching the fourth amendment issue, the
court in United States v. Long, 325 F. Supp. 583 (W.D.
Mo. 1971), afj'd, 453 F2d 1317 (8th Cir. 1972), held
that handwriting exemplars are inadmissible when ob-
tained without giving the defendant a Miranda warn-
ing. In Bradford v. United States, 413 F.2d 467 (5th
Cir. 1969), the court held that giving an exemplar after
receiving a Miranda warning is an indication that the
defendant offered the writing voluntarily.
2a Cert. granted -U.S.- (1972).
3 In re Dionisio, 442 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1971) cert.
granted,-U.S. (1972).
4 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
5 But see United States v. Praigg, 336 F. Supp. 480
(C.D. Cal. 1972), where the standard for acquiring
exemplars cannot be reasonableness, but must be prob-
ing to Mara, the reasonableness test will be satis-
fied by a showing of the relevance of the exemplar
to the inquiry being made by the grand jury, the
necessity of acquiring the exemplar, and a showing
that the information sought cannot be obtained in
any manner other than by an exemplar.
Harris and Mara present a different approach
to the admissibility of handwriting exemplars.
Ignoring the quandry of whether they are testi-
monial or non-testimonial evidence,6 they exclude
exemplars on the basis of how they were acquired,
not by their evidentiary classification.
PRIsoNERs' RIGHTs
Several recent decisions should increase the
number and complexity of prisoners' rights suits
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Wilwording v.
Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971), the Supreme Court
held that a prisoner suing under § 1983 does not
have to exhaust state remedies before bringing
a civil rights complaint and that habeas corpus
petitions can be interpreted as complaints under
§ 1983. The Court noted that the advantage of
interpreting a habeas corpus petition as a civil
rights complaint is to relieve prisoners from the
burden of the exhaustion of the state remedies
requirement of habeas corpus petitions.
Although exhaustion has not been considered
a condition precedent to bringing civil rights ac-
tions in areas other than prisoners rights,7 prior
to Wilwording courts consistently held that pris-
oners' § 1983 complaints could be recognized only
if there had been exhaustion of state remedies
able cause. One explanation for this contrary result in
Mara is that Praig was not concerned with a grandjury witness but with an accused held in police custody.
6 Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), and
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), held
that nontestimonial evidence such as handwriting ex-
emplars and blood tests are not protected by the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See
also United States v. Izzi, 427 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1970);
United States v. Bandy, 421 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1970);
United States v. Rudy, 429 F.2d 993 (9th Cir. 1970);
United States v. Doe, 405 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1968);
State v. Thompson, 256 La. 934, 2.40 So.2d 712 (1970);
State v. Toelle, 10 Md. App. 292, 269 A.2d 628 (1970);
Smith v. State, 462 P.2d 328 (Okla. Crim. App. 1969).7See, e.g., Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967);
McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668 (1963);
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A variety
of reasons have been used by the courts to justify
this requirement. First, it was held that allowing
relief under § 1983 where there was no requirement
of exhaustion would erode the balance of federal-
state comity created under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.8
Second, the courts created a rule of pleading in
which a prisoner had to opt for habeas corpus
relief even though his case was properly cognizable
under § 1983 as well.9 Third, some courts severely
restricted the applicability of § 1983 remedies,
holding that they could not be used to grant equi-
table relief or release of prisoners from confine-
ment.10 In this last circumstance, habeas corpus
was the proper procedure.
Wilwording rejects the first two rationales of
prios case law. Under Wilwording, exhaustion is
neither required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254 nor must
a prisoner bring his case in habeas corpus when
he has a civil rights complaint on the very same
issues. The third justification of the prior cases,
that § 1983 cannot be used for the release of pris-
oners, is not specifically answered by the Court
in Wilwording.
However, the Second Circuit recently held that
the third rationale is not totally correct. In
Rodriquez v. McGinnis, 451 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1972),
the court of appeals reversed itself on rehearing"
and held that prisoners' complaints seeking release
can properly be construed as § 1983 actions. Thus,
the Second Circuit, one of the more adamant courts
in dismissing civil rights complaints, 2 held that
petitions requesting release from custody might be
cognizable under § 1983 and do not have to be
brought in habeas corpus. Although most members
of the majority felt that the Court's opinion in
'Smart v. Avery, 411 F.2d 408 (6th Cir. 1969);
Johnson v. Walker, 317 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1963).
28 U.S.C. § 2254 requires that available state rem-
edies be exhausted before seeking habeas corpus relief.9 Grayson v. Montgomery, 421 F.2d 1306 (1st Cir.
1970); Baker v. McGinnis, 286 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.
N.Y. 1968); King v. McGinnis, 289 F. Supp. 466 (S.D.
N.Y. 1968). But see Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp.
621 (E.D. Va. 1971).
10 Rodriquez v. McGinnis, 451 F.2d 730 (2d Cir.
1971); Katzoff v. McGinnis, 441 F.2d 558 (2d Cir.
1971); Gaito v. Ellenbogen, 425 F.2d 845 (3rd Cir.
1970). Consistent with this determination of stating a
claim under § 1983 is the holding by some courts that
only habeas corpus can be used for release from con-
finement. See, e.g., Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th
Cir. 1968); Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816 (3d Cir. 1968).
" Rodriquez y. McGinnis, 451 F.2d 730 (2d Cir.
1971).
12 See, e.g., Rodriquez v. McGinnis, 451 F.2d 730
(2d Cir. 1971); Katzoff v. McGinnis, 441 F.2d 558
(2d Cir. 1971).
Wilwording was not necessary for their decision;
three judges felt constrained to note that they
were reversing solely on the basis of the Supreme
Court decision.
The dissenting judges in Rodriquez noted that
the combined effect of the majority's holding and
Wilwording will be to increase considerably the
number of § 1983 cases, overburdening the federal
courts with more evidentiary hearings than would
have been necessary if complaints were interpreted
as habeas corpus petitions.13 The problem foreseen
by the dissenters might be augmented by Haines
v. Kerner, 92 S. Ct. 594 (1972), where the Supreme
Court held that § 1983 complaints should be liber-
ally construed and not summarily dismissed for
failing to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.14 Furthermore, the Court in Haines held
that prisoners bringing § 1983 actions should be
given every opportunity to present evidence to
substantiate their claims.
A second area in which the federal courts might
have increasingly large workloads in § 1983 cases
is the growing recognition of pendent jurisdiction
in civil rights cases. The court in Eidschun v. Pierce,
335 F. Supp. 603 (S.D. Iowa 191), held that it
would take jurisdiction over a state common law
tort clain when brought with a prisoner's § 1983
action. While some other courts have exercised
pendent jurisdiction in prisoners' rights cases, 5
none have done so where one of the defendants in
the pendent state claim was not a party in the
§ 1983 action.16 Eidschun held that taking jurisdic-
tion of such a claim was proper.
Notwithstanding the misgivings of the Rodriquez
dissenters, these recent cases contribute signifi-
canty to adjudicating prisoners' suits. If a pris-
oner has a § 1983 claim, it should be liberally
construed. The claim will not be dismissed for
failure to exhaust state remedies and state tort
claims may be brought with it.
13 The dissenters noted that evidentiary hearings will
almost always have to be made in § 1983 cases, while
they are not nearly as frequent in habeas corpus pro-
ceedings.
14 See also Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir.
1968); Sharp v. Sigler, 277 F. Supp. 963 (D. Neb. 1967),
afJ'd, 408 F.2d 966 (8th Cir. 1969).
16 See, e.g., Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183 (5th
Cir. 1971). But see Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
ex rel. Feiling v. Sincavage, 313 F. Supp. 967 (W.D.
Pa. 1970), aff'd, 439 F.2d 1133 (3rd Cir. 1971) (the
Civil Rights Act was never intended to allow the pen-
dency of state common law claims).
'6 Barrows v. Faulkner, 327 F. Supp. 1190 (N.D.
Okla. 1971).
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